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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter resulting in this appeal
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). These issues were addressed in
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE HUTTERS
FILED A NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT ON MAY 30, 2006.

Standard of Review
The question of whether the Hutters filed a Notice of Commencement is a mixed
question of law and fact. To determine the standard of review for a mixed question of
law and fact, appellate courts "apply a test that considers (1) the complexity of the facts;
(2) the degree to which the lower court relied on observable facts that cannot be
adequately reflected in the record, such as witness demeanor and appearance; and (3) any
policy reasons favoring or disfavoring the exercise of discretion." Mandell v. Auditing
Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n, 186 P.3d 335, 339 (Utah 2008).
Preservation for Appeal
This issued was preserved for appeal by being address in Dig-It's Memorandum in
Opposition to the Hutters' Petition for Nullification of Wrongful Lien [R. 27-28], and in
oral argument following the Evidentiary Hearing on October 30, 2007 [Transcript, Ex. A,
pp. 96-99].
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE HUTTERS
SATISFIED THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR ESTABLISHING THE
FILING OF A VALID NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT.

Standard of Review
"In a bench trial, the determination of whether a plaintiff has proven his or her
case by a preponderance of the evidence is a legal determination reviewed for
correctness." Handy v. U.S. Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 177 P.3d 80, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
Preservation for Appeal
This issued was preserved for appeal by being address in Dig-It's Memorandum in
Opposition to the Hutters' Petition for Nullification of Wrongful Lien [R. 22-29], and in
oral argument following the Evidentiary Hearing on October 30, 2007 [Transcript, Ex. A,
pp. 89-101].
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DIG-IT'S
MECHANICS' LIEN WAS A WRONGFUL LIEN UNDER SECTION 389A-102.

Standard of Review
The determination of whether a document is a Wrongful Lien under Utah Code
Ann. § 3 8-9a-102 is a question of law which the Court of Appeals will review for
correctness, affording the trial court no deference. Eldridge v. Farnswortbu 166 P.3d 639,
646 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
Preservation for Appeal
This issued was preserved for appeal by being address in Dig-Its Memorandum in
Opposition to the Hutters' Petition of Nullification of Wrongful Lien [R. 29-33], and in
2
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oral argument following the Evidentiary Hearing on October 30, 2007 [Transcript, Ex. A,
pp. 101-107].

STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
I.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31 (2007).

(l)(a)(i)(A) For a construction project where a building permit is issued to an original
contractor or owner-builder, within 15 days after the issuance of the building permit:
(I) the local government entity issuing that building permit shall input the building permit
application and transmit the building permit information to the database electronically by
way of the Internet or computer modem or by any other means; and
(II) the original contractor or owner-builder may file a notice of commencement based on
the building permit issued by the local government entity.
(B) The information submitted under Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A) forms the basis of a notice
of commencement.
(ii) The person to whom a building permit, filed under Subsection (l)(a)(i), is issued is
responsible for the accuracy of the information in the building permit.
(iii) For the purposes of classifying a record under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government
Records Access and Management Act, building permit information transmitted from a
local governmental entity to the database shall be classified in the database by the
division notwithstanding the local governmental entity's classification of the building
permit information.
(b) Within 15 days after commencement of physical construction work at the project site,
the original contractor or owner-builder may file a notice of commencement with the
database whether or not a building permit is issued or a notice of commencement is filed
under Subsection (l)(a).
(c) An owner of construction or an original contractor may file a notice of
commencement with the designated agent within the time prescribed by Subsections
(l)(a)and(b).
(d)(i) If duplicate notices of commencement are filed, they shall be combined into one
notice for each project and any notices filed relate back to the date of the earliest-filed
notice of commencement for the project.
(ii) A duplicate notice of commencement that is untimely filed relates back under
Subsection (l)(d)(i) if the earlier filed notice of commencement is timely filed,
(iii) Duplicate notices of commencement shall be automatically linked by the designated
agent.
(e) The designated agent shall assign each construction project a unique project number
that:
(i) identifies each construction project; and
(ii) can be associated with all notices of commencement, preliminary notices, and notices
3
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of completion.
(f) A notice of commencement is effective only as to any labor, service, equipment, and
material furnished to the construction project that is furnished subsequent to the filing of
the notice of commencement.
(2)(a) A notice of commencement shall include the following:
(i) the name and address of the owner of the project;
(ii) the name and address of the:
(A) original contractor; and
(B) surety providing any payment bond for the project, or if none exists, a statement that
a payment bond was not required for the work being performed; and
(iii)(A) the project address if the project can be reasonably identified by an address; or
(B) the name and general description of the location of the project if the project cannot be
reasonably identified by an address.
(b) A notice of commencement may include:
(i) a general description of the project; or
(ii) the lot or parcel number, and any subdivision, development, or other project name, of
the real property upon which the project is to be constructed if the project is subject to
mechanics' liens.
(c) A notice of commencement need not include all of the items listed in Subsection
(2)(a) if:
(i) a building permit is issued for the project; and
(ii) all items listed in Subsection (2)(a) that are available on the building permit are
included in the notice of commencement.
(3) If a notice of commencement for a construction project is not filed within the time set
forth in (l)(a) and (b), the following do not apply:
(a) Section 38-1-32; and
(b) Section 38-1-33.
(4)(a) Unless a person indicates to the division or designated agent that the person does
not wish to receive a notice under this section, electronic notice of the filing of a notice of
commencement or alternate notice as prescribed in Subsection (1), shall be provided to:
(i) all persons who have filed notices of commencement for the project; and
(ii) all interested persons who have requested notices concerning the project.
(b)(i) A person to whom notice is required under Subsection (4)(a) is responsible for:
(A) providing an e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number to which a notice
required by Subsection (4)(a) is to be sent; and
(B) the accuracy of any e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number to which
notice is to be sent.
(ii) The designated agent fulfills the notice requirement of Subsection (4)(a) when it
sends the notice to the e-mail address, mailing address, or telefax number provided to the
4
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designated agent whether or not the notice is actually received.
(5)(a) The burden is upon any person seeking to enforce a notice of commencement to
verify the accuracy of information in the notice of commencement and prove that the
notice of commencement is filed timely and meets all of the requirements in this section.
(b) A substantial inaccuracy in a notice of commencement renders the notice of
commencement unenforceable.
(c) A person filing a notice of commencement by alternate filing is responsible for
verifying and changing any incorrect information in the notice of commencement before
the expiration of the time period during which the notice is required to be filed.
(6) At the time a building permit is obtained, each original contractor shall conspicuously
post at the project site a copy of the building permit obtained for the project.
II.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9a-102 (2005).

As used in this chapter, "wrongful lien" refers to a lien made in violation of Section 76-6503.5, and includes an instrument or document as defined in Section 38-9-1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case presents two questions of first impression to Utah Appellate Courts: 1)

whether the mere presence of building permit information in the State Construction
Registry constitutes a notice of commencement despite the evidentiary burden set forth in
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-31(5)(a); and 2) whether the lack of a preliminary notice

converts a mechanics' lien into a wrongful lien as defined in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9a102.
In this case, certain building permit information was faxed to the State
Construction Registry by Weber County in May, 2006. That information was displayed
in the State Construction Registry and made available for searching and the filing of
preliminary notices by potential lien claimants. The building permit information did not
5
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include the city, state, or zip code of the owner, and the owners did not search and make
any corrections to the permit information until March, 2007.
Dig-It did not search the State Construction Registry or file a preliminary notice.
When a dispute arose between the owner and the builder, and the builder failed to pay
Dig-It, Dig-It filed a mechanics' lien to secure its collection rights and commenced
foreclosure of that lien. As a defense to Dig-It's lien, the Hutters claimed that despite
their indifference to the State Construction Registry requirements for timely and
accurately filing notices of commencement, the building permit information submitted to
the State Construction Registry by Weber County was a valid and enforceable notice of
commencement which placed an affirmative obligation on Dig-It to preserve its lien
rights by filing a timely and accurate preliminary notice. According to the Hutters, DigIt's failure to file a preliminary notice voided its right to file a mechanics' lien, so the
Hutters were entitled to have the lien enjoined under Utah's Wrongful Lien Injunction
Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9a-101, et seq.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

1.

The proceeding was commenced on August 1, 2007, when Petitioners filed their

Petition for Nullification of Dig-It's Mechanics Lien [R. 1-5].
2.

Prior to the filing of the Petition, Dig-It filed an action to commence the

foreclosure of its lien in the matter entitled Dig-It, Inc. v. Tim and Tami Hutter, etal,
Case No. 070904567, Utah State Second District Court, Weber County, Ogden
Department, State of Utah.
6
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3.

On September 10, 2007, Dig-It, Inc. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to

Hutters' Petition for Wrongful Lien [R. 22-34].
4.

On October 30, 2007, an Evidentiary Hearing was held before Honorable Ernie W.

Jones, Utah State Second District Court, Weber County, Ogden Department [R. 109-10].
5.

On November 13, 2007, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision granting

the Petition for Nullification of Dig-It's Mechanics Lien [R. 111-15].
6.

On December 24, 2007, the Court entered its Final Order [R. 122-24].

7.

On January 15, 2008, Dig-It, Inc. filed its Notice of Appeal [R. 125-27].

III.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
On December 24, 2007, the trial court entered its Final Order concluding the

mechanics' lien filed by Dig-It was a Wrongful Lien and nullifying the lien pursuant to
the Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9a-101, el seq. Based
upon a stipulation of the parties, the separate foreclosure action, Case No. 070904567 has
been stayed pending the resolution of this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellant, Dig-It, Inc., (hereinafter "Dig-It"), is an excavation contractor who

performed work on property owned by Appelles [R. 11L \ 1].
2.

Appellees, Timothy Michael and Tamra McQueen Hutter, (collectively hereinafter

"Hutters"), are the owners of certain real property located in Weber County, State of
Utah, and more particularly described as follows [R. 9]:
ALL OF LOT 53, ELKHORN SUBDIVISION PHASE 3, WEBER COUNTY,
UTAH.
7
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3.

On or about May 22, 2006, a building permit was issued to Jeromy's Homes for

construction of the Hutters' residence. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 10,1. 19; R. 112, ^|15]. A
copy of the permit is attached as Ex. B.
4.

Thereafter, on May 26, 2006, the Weber County Building Department faxed a

copy of the building permit to Utah Interactive, and the information in that permit was
converted to a data file and then uploaded into the Utah State Construction Registry.
ITranscript Ex. A, p. 13,1. 5 to p. 15,1. 7; R. 112,1J151.
5.

From May 30, 2006 to March 2007, neither Jeromy's Homes nor the Hutters took

any action to review the building permit information submitted to the State Construction
Registry by Weber County. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 52,1. 2 to p. 53,1. 25].
6.

In March 2007, the Hutters fired Jeromy's Homes and took over the construction

of their home as a general contractor. [Transcript, Ex. A, pp. 44-45, 50].
7.

In March 2007, after the Hutters fired Jeromy's Homes, the Hutters logged into

the State Construction Registry and submitted information, including an email address,
and paid $7.00 for the filing of a notice of commencement. [Transcript, Ex. A, pp. 5056].
8.

After concluding its work on the property, Dig-It was not paid by Jeromy's Homes

for the work completed. [Transcript, Ex. A, pp. 60-62].
9.

As a result of non-payment, Dig-It filed a lien against the property in the office of

the Weber County Recorder on June 6, 2007, as Entry 2269167. [R. 111, If 2; R. 1]. A
copy of the lien is attached as Ex. C.
8
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10.

Dig-It never filed a preliminary notice in the State Construction Registry. [R. 112,

H 6&7].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
HUTTERS FILED A NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT ON MAY 30, 2006.
In nullifying Dig-It's mechanics' lien, the trial court concluded that the Hutters

filed a notice of commencement on May 30, 2006, and that Dig-It was therefore
precluded from holding a valid lien due to Dig-It's failure to file a preliminary notice.
However, no evidence was presented that a notice of commencement was filed by the
Hutters on May 30, 2006, or by anyone else with authority to file a notice of
commencement in their behalf.
Furthermore, a preliminary notice is not necessary to hold a valid lien when a
notice of commencement has not been filed. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31(3) (2007).
Accordingly, the trial court erred in nullifying Dig-It's mechanics' lien because the
Hutters failed to prove that a notice of commencement was filed on May 30, 2006.

11.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
HUTTERS MET THEIR BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THEY WERE
ENTITLED TO ENFORCE THE PROPOSED NOTICE OF
COMMENCEMENT.
The Utah Legislature has provided that "[t]he burden is upon any person seeking

to enforce a notice of commencement to verify the accuracy of information in the notice
of commencement and prove that the notice of commencement is filed timely and meets
all of the requirements in this section." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a) (2007). In this
9
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case, the Hutters failed to provide any evidence that they timely verified the accuracy of
the information contained in the proposed notice of commencement or that the proposed
notice of commencement was timely filed and met all of the requirements of UTAH CODE
ANN. §38-1-31.
To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the Hutters did not meet any of the
burdens imposed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a). Consequently, the trial court
erred in nullifying Dig-It's mechanics' lien because a preliminary notice did not need to
be filed in light of the Hutters' failure to meet their burden to prove that they could
enforce the proposed notice of commencement.
III.

THE MECHANICS' LIEN FILED BY DIG-IT PURSUANT TO UTAH'S
MECHANICS' LIEN ACT WAS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN.
Under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute, a "wrongful lien" is defined as "a lien

made in violation of Section 76-6-503.5, and includes an instrument or document as
defined in Section 38-9-1. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9a-102 (2005). Dig-It's mechanics'
lien was not made in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-503.5 and does not fall within
the definition of a wrongful lien under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1. Thus, the trial court
erred by applying Utah's Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute to nullify Dig-It's mechanics'
lien.

10
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HUTTERS
FILED A NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT ON MAY 30, 2006,
The filing date of a notice of commencement is a mixed question of law and fact.

To determine the standard of review for a mixed question of law and fact, appellate
courts "apply a test that considers (1) the complexity of the facts; (2) the degree to which
the lower court relied on observable facts that cannot be adequately reflected in the
record, such as witness demeanor and appearance; and (3) any policy reasons favoring or
disfavoring the exercise of discretion." Mandell v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax
Com'n, 186 P.3d 335, 339 (Utah 2008).
As the following review will show, this is not a factually complex matter, nor is
there a dispute over the veracity of testimony from witnesses. Instead, the questions of
when and who filed the notice of commencement mix various factual information, i.e. the
dates information was filed in the State Construction Registry and the source of that
information; with questions of law, namely the legal conclusion of when the notice of
commencement was filed and who filed, as required by UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-31(1).
The trial court should be granted discretion, as the fact-finder, concerning the
sufficiency of the evidence to determine who filed what information on which date, but
the conclusion as to the date that the notice of commencement was filed is a question of
law to be reviewed for correctness. Questions about the legal adequacy of findings of
fact and the conclusions of the trial court present questions of law which are to be

11
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reviewed for correctness. Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R&R Group, Inc., — P.3d —, 2008
WL 2446052 (Utah Ct. App 2008).
A.

The Evidence was Insufficient to Support a Finding that the Hutter's Filed a
Notice of Commencement on May 30, 2006.
A preliminary notice is not necessary to hold a valid lien unless a notice of

commencement is filed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31(3) (2007). Conversely, when a
valid notice of commencement has been filed, a potential lien claimant must file a
preliminary notice in order to preserve the right to hold a valid lien. UTAH CODE ANN. §
38-l-32(l)(d)(i)(A) (2007). In nullifying Dig-It's mechanics' lien, the trial court found
that the Hutters filed a notice of commencement on May 30,2006 [R. 113, f 21], and that
Dig-It was therefore precluded from holding a valid lien due to Dig-It's failure to file a
preliminary notice [R. 113, fH 35-36].
To successfully challenge such findings, "an appellant must first marshal all the
evidence supporting the finding[s] and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the
court below. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 186 P.3d 1012, |12 (Utah Ct.
App. 2008). In fulfillment of that burden, Dig-It presents the following exhaustive list of
evidence from which the Court could conclude a person filed the notice of
commencement asserted in this matter:
1.

Craig Brown, Weber County Building Inspection testified:
a.
Weber County issued a building permit for the Hutter's residence on May
22, 2006. ITranscript Ex. A. p. 10,11.14-19].
b.
Weber County faxes its building permits to the State Construction Registry
about once a week. [Transcript Ex. A, p. 11,11. 4-15]
12
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c.

Weber County has never paid to transmit building permit information and
has never received a receipt for transmitting permit information.
|Transcript Ex. A, p. 11,11 16-22].

2.

Jeff Buist, Utah Interactive, SCR System Maintenance Technician:
a.
The State Construction Registry received building permit information from
Weber County by fax on May 26, 2006, and the building permit
information was filed into the SCR on May 30, 2006 [Transcript, Ex. A, pp.
13,1. 19 to p. 15,1.7.].
b.
Utah Interactive does not charge municipalities for filing building permit
information and had no receipt showing payment for the alleged notice of
commencement in this action. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 15,1. 8 to p. 16,1. 8].
c.
The only information in the State Construction Registry relating to the
Weber County building permit came from Weber County. [Transcript, Ex.
A, p. 19,11. 8-17].
d.
The building permit information was confirmed on March 17, 2007.
[Transcript, Ex. A, pp. 20-21].

3.

Michael Rice, Utah Interactive, SCR Project Manager
a.
The building permit information from Weber County was filed in the SCR
on May 30, 2006. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 23,1. 13 to p. 24,1. 14].

4.

Tom Harper, SCR Manager, Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing,
Utah State Department of Commerce.
a.
For the Division's purposes, the SCR filing date for the Weber County
building permit information was May 30, 2006. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 42,11.
6-11].

5.

Tim Hutter, Owner
a.
Prior to March, 2007, he was aware of the State Construction Registry, but
did not feel he had a need to look at it. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 50,11. 8-10].
b.
He attempted to make a change to the building permit information for his
home in March 2007. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 52,1. 19 to p. 53,1. 25].
c.
He paid the SCR filing fee for the building permit information in March
2007. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 54,1. 1 to p. 56,1. 56].
From this review of facts, it is clear that information for the Hutter residence was

entered by various people at two different times. In May 2006, Weber County issued a
building permit, faxed the permit to the State Construction Registry; and on May 30,
13
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2006, the building permit information was filed in the State Construction Registry by
Utah Interactive and its agents. In March 2007, the owner, Tim Hutter, logged in to the
State Construction Registry for the first time, edited the building permit information and
paid the filing fee.
For the reasons set forth in detail below, it was error for the Court to find that the
filing of building permit information in the State Construction Registry by Weber County
and Utah Interactive on May 30, 2006, was the date of filing by the Hutters, as opposed
to March 2007 when they verified and paid for the filing.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Building Permit Information
from Weber County was a Notice of Commencement Filed by the Hutters.
The trial court's conclusion was based solely on the fact that Weber County

submitted the building permit information to the State Construction Registry by alternate
filing. [R. 113, ]f 28]. There is no evidence showing that the Hutters, their builder, or
any other person acting on their behalf filed any information in the State Construction
Registry until March 2007. [Transcript, Ex. A, pp. 50-53]. Nevertheless, the trial court
concluded that the "Hutters" filed a notice of commencement on May 30, 2006. [R. 113,
121]. For the trial court's conclusion to be correct, the Court will have to conclude that
the building permit information Weber County faxed to the State Construction Registry
was effectively the Hutters' filing of a notice of commencement. [Transcript, Ex. A, pp.
14-15]. To determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the building permit
information created a notice of commencement, we must look to UTAH CODE ANN. §381-31, which governs notices of commencement.
14
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Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(l)(a)(i) the building permit information
submitted by Weber County constituted only the basis of a notice of commencement.
This section provides:
(A) For a construction project where a building permit is issued to an original
contractor or owner-builder, within 15 days after the issuance of the building
permit: (I) the local government entity issuing that building permit shall input the
building permit application and transmit the building permit information to the
database electronically by way of the Internet or computer modem or by any other
means; and (II) the original contractor or owner-builder may file a notice of
commencement based on the building permit issued by the local government
entity,
(B) The information submitted [by the local government entity issuing the
building permit] under Subsection (l)(A)(i)(A) forms the basis of a notice of
commencement.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-1-3 l(l)(a)(i) (2007) (emphasis added).

With specific regard to the Mechanics Lien Statute, the Utah Supreme Court has
stated, "[u]nder our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain
language to determine its meaning. We read the plain language of a statute as a whole
and interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with
other statutes under the same and related chapters." Sill v. Hart, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102
(Utah 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In addition, "[w]e assume that
each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Id. at 1103.
From the plain language of the statute, two important rules for evaluating notices
of commencement appear: (1) the building permit information submitted by Weber
County only formed the basis of a notice of commencement; and (2) Weber County is not
15
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one of the only two groups that are authorized to file a notice of commencement based on
that building permit information: original contractors and owner-builders.1
Furthermore, a piecemeal reading of the statute is contrary to established rules for
statutory construction: "[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole and
interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions of the same statute and other
statutes under the same and related chapters. We do so because a statute is passed as a
whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose or intent.
Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other
part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole." Id. at 1102 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
With these rules of construction in mind, it is evident that construing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-1-3l(l)(a)(i) as enabling the local government entity to file a notice of
commencement without any action on the part of the original contractor, owner-builder,
or the owner would render as mere surplusage the statute's provision that "the original
contractor or owner-builder may file a notice of commencement based on the building
permit issued by the local government entity." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31(1 )(a)(i)(A)
(2007). If building permit information is a self-executing notice of commencement, then

Utah Code § 38-l-31(l)(c) also provides that "[a]n owner of construction or an original
contractor may file a notice of commencement. . .." Again, however, neither Weber
County nor the State Construction Registry itself qualifies as the owner of the Hutters
construction or the Hutters original contractor.
16
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there is no need to allow owners and contractors to file a notice of commencement
"based" upon the building permit information.2
In addition, the trial court's conclusion is inconsistent with UTAH ADMIN R.15638B-506 (2006). Rule R156-38b-506 provides that where an alternate filing method is
used [R. 113, If 28],
The official filing date of a particular [notice of commencement] filing shall be
determined as follows: .. .(2) In the case of an alternate method filing, it shall be
the date upon which the designated agent received a filing that was ultimately
accepted into the SCR including content requirements and payment.
Before the trial court, Dig-It vigorously argued that a notice of commencement
was not filed by the Hutters until March 2007, which is when Mr. Hutter testified he
finally logged in to the State Construction Registry, edited, and paid for the notice of
commencement. [Transcript, Ex. A, pp. 92-99]. Yet, the trial court concluded that
payment is only required for electronically filed notices of commencement, and since the
Hutters use an alternate method, no payment was required. [R. 113, ^ 28].
The trial court's ruling does not expound on its conclusion or provide a rationale
basis for ignoring the applicable half of Rule R156-38b-506. Thus, this Court should
conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the Hutters filed a notice of

2

Utah Code § 38-l-31(l)(d) acknowledges that duplicate notices of commencement
could be filed, but this acknowledgement is necessary due to the fact that there are three
separate entities that are authorized to file a notice of commencement on a single project:
the original contractor, the owner-builder, and the owner of the construction project.
Thus, provisions for duplicate notices of commencement should not be construed to
imply that Weber County and the State Construction Registry itself have authority to file
a notice of commencement.
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commencement on May 30, 2006, because the Hutters have presented no evidence that
they themselves or their contractor filed a notice of commencement on that date, and
Weber County was not authorized to file a notice of commencement for them.
Accordingly, the trial court also erred in nullifying Dig-It's mechanics' lien on the basis
that Dig-It did not file a preliminary notice because a preliminary notice was not
necessary to hold a valid lien unless a valid and enforceable notice of commencement had
been timely filed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31(3) (2007).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HUTTERS
MET THEIR BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO
ENFORCE THE PROPOSED NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT.
The Utah Legislature has provided that u[t]he burden is upon any person seeking

to enforce a notice of commencement to verify the accuracy of information in the notice
of commencement and prove that the notice of commencement is filed timely and meets
all ofthe requirements in this section." UTAHCODEANN. § 38-1-3 l(5)(a) (2007). In its
Memorandum Decision, the Court does not specifically discuss the Hutters compliance
with the verification requirement other than to say that the Hutters met their burden of
proof for a notice of commencement. [R. 114, ]j 39].
In this case, the Hutters evidence was insufficient to conclude that they timely
verified the accuracy of the information contained in the proposed notice of
commencement or that the proposed notice of commencement was timely filed and met
all of the requirements of UTAHCODEANN. § 38-1-31.
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To the contrary, the evidence establishes that the Hutters did not meet any of the
burdens imposed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a). Consequently, the trial court
erred in nullifying Dig-It's mechanics' lien because the Hutters failed to put themselves
in a position to enforce the proposed notice of commencement.
A.

The Hutters Failed to Timely Verify the Accuracy of the Information in the
Proposed Notice of Commencement.
A notice of commencement defense to a lien claim only arises when a lien

claimant has filed a lien without having first filed a preliminary notice. The only way for
a potential lien claimant to file a preliminary notice is to first find the notice of
commencement to which the preliminary notice must attach in the State Construction
Registry database. [Transcript, Ex. A, p. 32,1. 19 to p. 33,1. 2]. In order to find a
particular notice of commencement, a potential lien claimant must input information
contained in the notice of commencement into the search engine used by the State
Construction Registry. [Transcript Ex. A, p. 25,1. 17 to p. 26,1. 13]. If a notice of
commencement cannot be found, then a preliminary notice cannot be filed. [Transcript,
Ex. A, p. 32,1. 19 to p. 33,1.2].
Accordingly, the difficulty in filing a preliminary notice is compounded when the
information in the notice of commencement is inaccurate. For example, if a notice of
commencement is incorrectly filed under the name of "Huter" and a potential lien
claimant searches under the correct name of "Hutter", the search engine will not retrieve
the notice of commencement and the potential lien claimant, through no fault of its own,
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will not be able to protect its lien rights by filing a preliminary notice. ["Transcript, Ex. A,
p. 25,1. 20 to p. 26,1. 13; and p. 29,1. 13 to p. 33,1. 2].,
To protect against the nullification of liens by notices of commencement with
inaccurate information, the Utah Legislature placed a significant burden on owners and
general contractors to make sure the notice of commencement information is complete
and accurate. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a), "[t]he burden is upon any person
seeking to enforce a notice of commencement to verify the accuracy of information in the
notice of commencement

" UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a) (2007).

In light of the Utah Supreme Court's observation that "[t]he purpose and intent of
Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act.. . manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who
perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building
or other improvement," Sill, 162 P.3d at 1102-03 (internal quotations and citations
omitted), it makes sense that the Legislature requires the party seeking to enforce a notice
of commencement to affirmatively verify the accuracy of information in the notice of
commencement in order to earn the privilege of using the notice of commencement as a
sword to destroy a mechanics' lien claim.
However, the burden to verify articulated by the Utah Legislature in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a) is meaningless unless: (1) verification occurs within the deadline
for filing a notice of commencement; and (2) a notice of commencement is unenforceable
if the party seeking enforcement fails to prove that it verified the accuracy of the
information.
20
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First, in order for the burden of verification to have any significance, verification
must occur within the fifteen (15) day deadline for filing a notice of commencement.
Since preliminary notices preserving lien rights must be attached to a notice of
commencement within twenty (20) days of the lien claimant's first date of work under
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-32(l)(a)(i), and the difficulty in filing a preliminary notice is
compounded when the information in the notice of commencement is inaccurate,
allowing for verification and correction of the notice of commencement after the notice
of commencement filing deadline would prejudice the ability of a lien claimant to protect
its lien rights.
In addition, allowing verification and correction of the notice of commencement
after the deadline would run afoul of the Utah Supreme Court's declaration that "[T|ien
statutes should be broadly construed" to protect potential mechanics' lien claimants. Sill
162 P.3d at 1102-03 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Furthermore, allowing verification and correction of the notice of commencement
after the filing deadline could enable those seeking to enforce a notice of commencement
to use UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a) as to tool to deny potential lien claimants the
opportunity to protect their lien rights. This could be accomplished simply by initially
inputting incorrect information into the notice of commencement and then verifying the
accuracy of the information contained in the notice of commencement after those seeking
to file a preliminary notice had checked to see if a notice of commencement had been
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filed. In this way, those seeking to enforce the notice of commencement could prevent
the filing of any preliminary notices.
The only way to prevent this unjust result is to interpret UTAH CODE ANN. §38-131(5)(a) as imposing the obligation to verify the accuracy of the information contained in
the notice of commencement prior to the deadline by which a notice of commencement
must be filed. Such an interpretation would ensure that potential lien claimants could not
be denied the opportunity to protect their lien rights due to mistakes (whether intentional
or unintentional) made by the party obligated to file the notice of commencement.
Moreover, if a notice of commencement is enforceable without verification, the
"burden" imposed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a) is not a burden at all, but rather
an empty mandate. Under its plain language, Section 38-1-3 l(5)(a) has meaning only if
a notice of commencement is enforceable by those who actually verify the accuracy of its
information.
These policy considerations and others must have been considered by the
Legislature when it clarified the verification element in section 38-l-31(5)(c), which
provides that, in the case of notices of commencement which are alternately filed, as
Weber County's information was in this case, verification must occur within fifteen (15)
days after the permit is issued.
Applying the foregoing analysis, the Hutters have not provided any evidence that
they verified the accuracy of the information contained in the notice of commencement
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prior to June 6, 2006, which was the deadline by which a notice of commencement could
be filed.3
In fact, the earliest that the Hutters even contend that they verified the accuracy of
the information contained in the notice of commencement is March 2007, which is well
past the June 25, 2006 date by which Dig-It was authorized to file a preliminary notice.4
As a result, the Hutters failed to meet their burden of proof with regard to verification,
and Dig-It was not required to file a preliminary notice in order to hold a valid
mechanics' lien.
B.

The Hutters Failed to Prove that the Proposed Notice Of Commencement was
Timely Filed.
In order to limit lien rights to only those lien claimants that filed a preliminary

notice, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(3)(a) (2007), the Hutters were required to file a
notice of commencement within fifteen (15) days after the issuance of their building
permit, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(l)(A)(i)(A) (2007). In addition, the Hutters bear the

If a building permit has been issued, a notice of commencement must be filed within
fifteen (15) days after the issuance of the building permit. See UTAH CODE ANN. §38-13 l(l)(a)(i). In his case, a building permit was issued on May 22, 2006. [Transcript, Ex.
A, p. 10,1. 19].
4

A preliminary notice must be filed by a subcontractor within twenty (20) days after the
commencement of its own work on a construction project. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-13l(l)(a)(i) (2007). Thus, a preliminary notice would have had to have been filed by June
25, 2006 because Dig-It began work on the construction project on June 5, 2006. [R.
007].
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burden to "prove that the notice of commencement [was] filed timely . . . . " UTAH CODE
ANN. §38-1-31 (5)(a) (2007).
Although the Hutters' building permit was issued on May 22, 2006, [Transcript,
Ex. A, p. 10,1. 19], and therefore the Hutters had until June 6, 2006 to file a notice of
commencement, the following questions still arise: (1) how is the official filing date of a
notice of commencement established for purposes of determining whether a notice of
commencement was filed timely; and (2) how can the person seeking to enforce a notice
of commencement prove that the notice of commencement was filed timely.
Pursuant to the Utah Legislature's mandate to "make rules and develop
procedures" to "oversee and enforce" the statutory provisions governing notices of
commencement, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-30(3)(a) (2006), the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing has promulgated UTAH ADMIN R. 156-38b-506 (2006). Rule
R156-38b-506 is an administrative rule that not only clarifies the official filing date for
notices of commencement, but also provides proof of timely filing for those seeking to
enforce notices of commencement:
The official filing date of a particular [notice of commencement] filing shall be
determined as follows: (1) in the case of an electronic filing, it shall be the date the
SCR accepts a filing input by the person making the filing and makes available a
payment receipt to the person making the filing. (2) In the case of an alternate
method filing, it shall be the date upon which the designated agent received a
filing that was ultimately accepted into the SCR including content requirements
and payment.
As set forth by this Court, "[administrative rules adopted pursuant to a statutory
grant of authority have the full force and effect of law. Thus, like a legislative
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amendment that clarifies ambiguous terms in a statute, such administrative rules may be
used to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions." V-l Oil Co. v. Department of
Environmental Quality, Division of Environmental Response and Remediation, 904 P.2d
214,218-19 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (internal citation omitted).
Using Rule R156-38b-506 to clarify how to determine whether a particular notice
of commencement has been filed timely is also consistent with this Court's analysis in
King v. Industrial Commission of Utah:
First, we determine whether the legislature explicitly granted discretion to the
agency to interpret or apply statutory language at issue. . . . [A] statute directing
the agency to interpret or apply specific statutory language should be interpreted
as an explicit grant of discretion. If we find such a grant, we review . . . for abuse
of discretion. That is, we afford the agency some deference and assess whether its
action is within the bounds of reasonableness.
Second, if we do not find an explicit grant of discretion, we examine the
language of the statute and the statutory framework for an implicit grant of
discretion. If the statutory language is broad and expansive or subject to numerous
interpretations we will assume the legislature has chosen to defer to the policy
making expertise of the agency and we will find an implicit grant of discretion and
review the action . . . for abuse of discretion.
King v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The Utah Legislature has mandated that the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing "shall make rules and develop procedures" to "oversee and
enforce" the statutory provisions governing notices of commencement. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-l-30(3)(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Thus, Rule R156-38b-506 clarifies how
to determine whether a notice of commencement has been filed timely. It provides that
when a notice is alternately filed, a payment must be received before the official filing
date of a notice of commencement can be determined. Once a notice is filed, the
25
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payment receipt contemplated by Rule R156-38b-506 provides the evidence with which
those seeking to enforce a notice of commencement can meet their burden of proof with
regard to whether the notice of commencement was filed timely. This method of proving
the filing date is consistent with the Utah Legislature's directive that State Construction
Registry "provide hard-copy printing of electronic receipts for an individual filing
evidencing the date and time of the individual filing and the content of the individual
filing." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-27(2)(g) (2006).
In light of the fact that "[t]he [Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing] and the designated agent need not determine the timeliness of any notice
before filing the notice in the database" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-27(7), it makes
sense that the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing would articulate a
rule to determine whether a notice filed in the State Construction Registry database
purporting to be a notice of commencement was filed timely.
Finally, requiring payment before the official filing date of a notice of
commencement can be established is consistent with funding provisions of the State
Construction Registry. The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing must
establish fees for those seeking to file notices in the State Construction Registry database,
including fees for those seeking to file notices of commencement. UTAH CODE ANN. §
38-l-27(4)(a) (2006). The purpose of the fees is to "create and maintain" the State
Construction Registry database. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-27(4)(b) (2006). Furthermore,
"[t]he fees allowed under Subsection (4)(a) may vary by method of filing if one form of
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

filing is more costly to process than another form of filing." UTAH CODE ANN. §38-127(4)(c) (2006).
Thus, it is plain to see that the Utah Legislature intended for those seeking to file a
notice of commencement to bear their share of the burden with regard to the cost
associated with the creation and maintenance of the State Construction Registry database.
Accordingly, requiring payment before the official filing date for a notice of
commencement is determined is a reasonable way for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing to ensure that those filing notices of commencement share in the
cost burdens imposed by running and maintaining the State Construction Registry
database.
Applying the foregoing analysis, although the Hutters have failed to provide a
payment receipt to evidence the official filing date of their proposed notice of
commencement, the Hutters contend that they made payment for their notice of
commencement in March of 2007. However, the deadline by which they could file an
enforceable notice of commencement was June 6, 2006. Accordingly, the Hutters failed
to timely file a notice of commencement and Dig-It was not required to file a preliminary
notice in order to hold a valid lien. UTAHCODEANN. § 38-l-31(3)(a) (2007).
C.

The Hutters Failed to Prove that the Proposed Notice of Commencement Met
All of the Requirements of Utah Code § 38-1-31.
The Utah Legislature has provided that "[t]he burden is upon any person seeking

to enforce a notice of commencement to . .. prove that the notice of commencement...
meets all of the requirements in this section." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a) (2007).
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One of the mandatory requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31 is that "[a] notice of
commencement shall include . . . the name and address of the owner of the project. . . . "
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-31(2)(a) (2007) (emphasis added).

However, the proposed notice of commencement did not include the city, state,
and zip code of the owner of the project. [R 112, ]f 13]. Thus, the notice failed to met all
of the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31 and should have been deemed
unenforceable by the trial court.
Instead, the trial court erroneously relied on UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(2)(c) for
the proposition that a notice of commencement does not need to include the address of
the owner of the project when a building permit has been issued for the project and the
party that filed the building permit neglected to include the address of the owner of the
project on the building permit.
Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(2)(c) provides that "[a] notice of
commencement need not include all of the items listed in Subsection (2)(a) [such as the
name and address of the owner of the project] if: (i) a building permit is issued for the
project; and (ii) all items listed in Subsection (2)(a) that are available on the building
permit are included in the notice of commencement." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 l(2)(c)
(2007) (emphasis added).
In this case, the Hutters were issued a building permit, but the person that filled
out the building permit neglected to include the Hutters' city, state, and zip code in the
space provided on the building permit. [R 014]. Spaces for the Hutters' city, state, and
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zip code were available on the building permit, but that information was never given to
Weber County, so Weber County never sent it to the State Construction Registry.
Although the trial court apparently interpreted the phrase "available on the building
permit" to mean the information actually entered on the building permit (i.e., only the
information listed in Subsection (2)(a) actually entered on the building permit needs to be
included in the notice of commencement), such an interpretation would lead to
incongruous results.
For example, the building permit includes a space for both the name and address
of the owner of the project. Under the trial court's interpretation of "available on the
building permit," if the building permit, as executed, failed to include both the name and
address of the owner of the project, a notice of commencement would not have to include
the name and address of the owner of the project. Remembering that preliminary notice
filers must search and find a notice of commencement before they can file a preliminary
notice, it would be considerably more difficult for a potential lien claimant to be sure that
a notice of commencement lacking the name and address of the owner of the project was
the correct notice of commencement to which a preliminary notice should be attached,
especially if the building permit was inaccessible to the potential lien claimant.5
A more thorough interpretation of the phrase "available on the building permit" is
that there is a space provided for the information on the building permit (i.e., all of the

5

It should be noted that the Hutters failed to provide any evidence that a building permit
was posted at the project cite as required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-31(6) (2007).
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information listed in Subsection (2)(a) that can be input into the building permit needs to
be included in the notice of commencement). Under this interpretation, the only items
listed in Subsection 2(a) that would not need to be included in the notice of
commencement are those items for which there is no space on the building permit to
input that information.
Applied to this case, the Hutters' should not be relieved of the obligation to
include the complete name and address of the owner of the project on the notice of
commencement solely because the filer of the building permit failed its UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 38-1-3l(l)(a)(ii) obligation to include the Hutters' complete address in the space
provided on the building permit.
To further justify its conclusion that the proposed notice of commencement was
enforceable in spite of the fact that the notice of commencement failed to meet all of the
requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31 due to its failure to include the city, state,
and zip code of the owner of the project, the trial court erroneously relied on the doctrine
of substantial compliance.
Applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to the evaluation of a notice of
commencement is inappropriate because the Utah Legislature has expressly provided that
"[substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to hold and
claim a lien" UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(2)(b) (2007) (emphasis added), or a
preliminary notice, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-32(2)(b) (2007), but not a notice of
commencement under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31 (2007). This purposeful omission is a
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significant factor in interpreting this section. When confronted with such an omission,
the Supreme Court advises:
In interpreting the meaning of a statute or ordinance, we begin first by looking to
the plain language of the ordinance. When examining the plain language, we must
assume that each term included in the ordinance was used advisedly. Additionally,
statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as
the exclusion of another. Thus, we should give effect to any omission in the
ordinance language by presuming that the omission is purposeful.
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, if the Utah Legislature intended for a notice of commencement that
substantially complied with the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31 to be
enforceable, then the Legislature would have drafted UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a)
to read: "[t]he burden is upon any person seeking to enforce a notice of commencement
to . . . prove that the notice of commencement. . . substantially complies with the
requirements in this section." Instead, the Utah Legislature has provided that "[t]he
burden is upon any person seeking to enforce a notice of commencement to . .. prove that
the notice of commencement. . . meets all of the requirements in this section." UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 38-1-3 l(5)(a) (2007) (emphasis added).

Thus, by mandating in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(2)(a) that the address of the
owner of the project "shall" be included in the notice of commencement, and that a party
seeking to enforce a notice of commencement bears the "burden" to prove that the notice
of commencement meets "all" of the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31, it
must be presumed that the Utah Legislature "advisedly" and "purposefully" foreclosed
the application of a substantial compliance standard to notices of commencement,
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especially in light of the fact that the Legislature explicitly provided for the application of
the substantial compliance standard to preliminary notices and lien claims.
Furthermore, in light of the fact that that notices of commencement are a narrow
exception to the broad, remedial purposes of the Mechanics' Lien Statute, applying a
substantial compliance standard to notices of commencement runs contrary to the Utah
Supreme Court's declaration that "[l]ien statutes should be broadly construed to [protect,
at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the
construction of a building or other improvement]." Sill, 162 P.3d at 1102-03 (internal
quotation omitted).
Public policy also weighs against adopting a substantial compliance standard with
regard to notices of commencement. The plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. §38-131(5)(a) articulates a clear, objective standard (i.e., all of the requirements of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-1-31 must be met, including the provision that a notice of commencement
shall include the name and address of the owner of the property) for determining whether
a notice of commencement is enforceable.
Such an objective, bright-line rule not only complies with the plain language of the
statute, but is also well within the capacity of those seeking to file a notice of
commencement. With regard to required information, the notices of commencement
need only include: (1) the name and address of the original contractor; (2) the name and
address of the owner; and (3) the address or description of the project. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 38-l-31(2)(a) (2007). If owners and original contractors do not have that
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information readily available, they have greater problems than compliance with the rules
for filing notices of commencement.
On the other hand, by adopting a substantial compliance standard, the hard and
fast rules defining whether a notice of commencement is enforceable would give way to
the differing opinions of different judges about what constitutes substantial compliance.
This subjective standard would promote litigation by creating an exception to the
requirement for notices of commencement to include "all" required information.
Thus, a simple, objective, bright-line test for determining whether a notice of
commencement complied with all of the requirements of the statute would be traded for a
subjective test based on whether the particular judge felt that the content of a particular
notice of commencement was close enough. Not only would such as subjective standard
invite litigation, but it would also unnecessarily burden those seeking to file a mechanics'
lien because of uncertainty as to whether an enforceable notice of commencement had
been filed.
Finally, it should be noted that a notice of commencement is not unenforceable
due to minor inaccuracies in the provided information. Only a substantial inaccuracy in
the provided information will make a notice of commencement unenforceable. UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-31(5)(b) (2007). Thus, after the burden to include in a notice of

commencement all of the information required by UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-31 (2)(a) is
met, the information itself is subject to a substantial inaccuracy standard.
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Consequently, the trial court erroneously relied on the doctrine of substantial
compliance to find that the proposed notice of commencement was enforceable in spite of
the fact that the notice of commencement did not meet all of the requirements of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 38-1-31 due to its failure to include the city, state, and zip code of the

owner of the project. As a result, the trial court erred in nullifying Dig-It's mechanics'
lien because the Hutters' proposed notice of commencement should have been deemed
unenforceable.
III.

THE MECHANICS' LIEN FILED BY DIG-IT PURSUANT TO UTAH'S
MECHANICS' LIEN ACT WAS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN.
In addition to the errors in interpreting and applying the provisions regarding

notices of commencement and preliminary notices, the trial court also erred in implicitly
concluding that Dig-It's lien was a wrongful lien. [R. 114]. The Wrongful Lien
Injunction Statute provides that "[a]ny person who believes that he or she is the victim of
a wrongful lien may file a verified written petition for a civil wrongful lien injunction
against the person filing, making, or uttering the lien . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9a201(l)(a)(2008).
A "wrongful lien" is defined under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute as "a lien
made in violation of Section 76-6-503.5, and includes an instrument or document as
defined in Section 38-9-1." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9a-102 (2005). However, the
mechanics' lien filed by Dig-It was not made in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6503.5 and does not meet the definition of a wrongful lien under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-
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1. Consequently, the Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute should not have been applied by
the trial court to nullify Dig-It's mechanics'lien.
A,

Dig-It's Mechanics5 Lien was Not Made in Violation of Utah Code § 76-6503.5.
There are only two ways by which a person can be in violation of UTAH CODE

ANN. § 76-6-503.5:
A person is guilty of the crime of wrongful lien if that person knowingly, makes,
utters, records, or files a lien: (a) having no objectively reasonable basis to believe
he has a present and lawful property interest in the property or a claim on the
assets; or (b) if the person files the lien in violation of a civil wrongful lien
injunction pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 9a, Wrongful Lien Injections.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-503.5(2) (2005) (emphasis added). Going in reverse order,

subsection (b) is inapplicable because there was not a civil wrongful lien injunction in
place when Dig-It filed its mechanics' lien. As to subsection (a), Dig-It had an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that it had a present and lawful interest in the
property when it filed its mechanics'lien.
The basis upon which Dig-It believed that it had a present and lawful interest in
the property includes the following facts: (1) Dig-It had not been compensated for the
labor and materials that it supplied for use in construction on the property; (2) Dig-It
believed that it was entitled to a mechanics' lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3; and (3)
Dig-It believed that it was not required to file a preliminary notice in order to hold a valid
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lien because, as set forth infra, Dig-It believed that the Hutters had not filed a valid and
enforceable notice of commencement with the State Construction Registry.6
The objective reasonableness of Dig-It's belief is underscored by the trial court's
Memorandum Decision finding that Dig-It filed its mechanics' lien action in "good faith"
and that "[t]he statutes which apply to a mechanics' lien are complex and subject to
different interpretation." [R. 113,fflf32-33]. Accordingly, Dig-It's mechanics' lien was
not in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5 and therefore could not be considered a
wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute pursuant to its incorporation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503.5.
B.

Dig-It's Mechanics' Lien Was Not a Wrongful Lien under Utah Code § 38-91.
Since Dig-It's mechanics' lien does not qualify as a wrongful lien under UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-503.5, it may only be a wrongful lien if it falls within the definition

set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1, which defines a wrongful lien as
any document that purports to create a lien, notice of interest, or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time
it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or
another state or federal statue . .. ."
Thus, a lien that was expressly authorized by a state statute at the time it was recorded or
filed is not a wrongful lien. In this case, the lien filed by Dig-It was expressly authorized

If a valid and enforceable notice of commencement has not been filed, then a
preliminary notice does not need to be filed in order to hold a valid lien. See UTAH CODE
ANN. §38-1-31(3) (2007).
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by Utah's Mechanics' Lien Statute at the time it was filed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1, et
seq.
Those who attempt to define mechanics' liens as wrongful for lack of
authorization under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 often resort to the misguided argument
that a mechanics' lien is not "expressly authorized" if a defense against the lien can be
presented to defeat the lien claim. For example, the Hutters' argued before the trial court
that Dig-It's mechanics' lien was not "authorized" because the Hutters filed a notice of
commencement and Dig-It failed to file a preliminary notice.
Taking the Hutters argument to its logical conclusion, however, exposes its
weakness. If the term "authorization" is analyzed within the context of meritorious
resolution, then there are only two classes of liens: successful liens and wrongful liens.
But if "authorization" is analyzed within the context of statutorily created legal rights,
then wrongful liens are only those which are not rooted in a particular provision of the
Code.
A more thorough interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 is that by
articulating a specific exception to the definition of a wrongful lien, i.e. liens "expressly
authorized" by statute, the Legislature intended to limit the definition of a wrongful lien
to only those liens which are not expressly regulated by specific provisions of the Code.
This conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history of the Wrongful Lien Statute.
When the language of a statute is plain, other interpretive tools are not
needed. However, if the language of the statute is ambiguous, the court
may look beyond the statute to the legislative history and public policy to
ascertain the statute's intent. When viewed holistically, a statute is
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ambiguous if duplicative, yet plausible meanings are not eliminated from
possibility.
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints, 164 P.3d
384, 396^47 (Utah 2007).
In 1985, Senator Matheson of the Utah Senate brought the wrongful lien bill in
response to liens that were being filed by members of certain fundamentalist groups in
southern Utah against local city and county officials that were attempting to enforce Utah
law against the fundamentalist groups. See Senate Floor Debates, 1985 General Session,
February 21, 1985, Afternoon Session, Disc #96, Side 1, [07] 4:00-5:36. Senator
Matheson stated that approximately $12 million dollars in liens had been filed against
these public officials, and that these liens were commonly referred to as "common law
liens" that were without any basis or support in the law. IdL
Senator Carling raised his concern that the language of the bill as proposed would
also apply to statutory liens such as mechanics' liens. Id. He further indicated that this
bill should not apply to those liens. Id. The original language of the bill defined a
wrongful lien as a lien that was without basis in the law, or that was "otherwise invalid."
Id. The senators agreed that this language was too broad inasmuch as it could be read to
include mechanics' liens and other statutory liens. Id, In order to protect statutory liens,
such as mechanics' liens, Senator Matheson agreed that the phrase "or is otherwise
invalid" should be stricken from the proposed bill. Id Furthermore, Senator Moll
indicated that the purpose of the bill was to keep fringe groups from filing common law
liens and that the bill should have no application whatsoever to mechanics' liens. See
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Senate Floor Debates, Utah State Legislature, 1985 General Session, February 21, 1985,
Afternoon Session, [10] 4:05 - 4:39 / [1] 01-64.
Thus, it is clear from the legislative history of UTAH CODE ANN. § 3 8-9-1 that the
definition of a "wrongful lien" is not intended to encompass statutorily regulated liens
because such liens are "authorized" in that they are regulated by a specific code section,
and the consequences for failing to succeed on such lien claims is managed within the
code sections which govern these liens. With these considerations in mind, it is apparent
that Dig-It's mechanics' lien was authorized at the time it was filed by Utah's Mechanics'
Lien Statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1, et seq.
Moreover, on June 6, 2007, the date Dig-It recorded its mechanics' lien, the
Hutters had yet to prove that their notice of commencement was enforceable. Under
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-31(5)(a), "[t]he burden is upon any person seeking to enforce a

notice of commencement to verify the accuracy of information in the notice of
commencement and prove that the notice of commencement is filed timely and meets all
of the requirements in this section." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a) (2007).
While it is true that building permit information had been submitted to the State
Construction Registry, and that Dig-It could have submitted a preliminary notice, the lack
of a preliminary notice did not deprive Dig-It of the opportunity to file its lien in order to
determine whether the Hutters could meet their burden to prove that they verified the
accuracy of the information in the notice of commencement and that the notice of
commencement was filed timely and met all of the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §
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38-1-31 (5)(a). Rather, Dig-It's decision not to file a preliminary notice merely provided
the Hutters with a defense to Dig-It's lien claim in the event that the Hutters could meet
the burden ofproof set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-31(5)(a).
Accordingly, at the time that Dig-It filed its mechanics' lien, it was not under any
statutory obligation to file a preliminary notice because the Hutters had yet to prove,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-31(5), that their proposed notice of commencement
was enforceable. Consequently, Dig-It's mechanics' lien was subject to a defense, but
nevertheless authorized as of its date of filing and therefore not a wrongful lien under
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 or under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute pursuant to its
incorporation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1.
This application of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 is consistent with
this Court's recent holding in Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 166 P.3d 639 (Utah Ct. App.
2007). In Eldridge, this Court was asked to determine whether a lis pendens filed by the
Plaintiffs as part of a lawsuit seeking to enforce a Real Estate Purchase Contract was a
wrongful lien. Id at 653. The Court ultimately determined that the Plaintiffs did not
have a valid contract for the purchase of the property. Id, at 650. Accordingly, the
Defendants argued that the lis pendens filed by the Plaintiffs was a "wrongful lien"
because the "claims in the complaint [were] later detennined to be without merit." Id. at
654. However, this Court looked to the express language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1
and concluded that whether the underlying claim is meritoriously resolved in favor of the
claimant is irrelevant to whether the claimant filed a wrongful lien:
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Section 38-9-1 requires a court to determine whether a lien is wrongful by
evaluating it at the time it is recorded or filed. Therefore, when evaluating the
[petitioners'] lis pendens, the trial court was required to evaluate its validity based
on the facts known at the time it was recorded, not at a later point in time after
evaluating the merits.
Idat654.
Similarly, the trial court in this case was under an obligation to evaluate whether
Dig-It's lien was wrongful at the time it was filed. At the time that Dig-It's mechanics
lien was filed, the Hutters' had yet to meet their burden to assert and "prove" the defense
that their "notice of commencement [was] filed timely and [met] all of the requirements
in [UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31]." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31(5) (2007).
Consequently, Dig-It's filing of a preliminary notice was not a prerequisite for Dig-It's
lien to be "authorized" by the Mechanics' Lien Statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-31(3)
(2007).
Since Dig-It's lien could only be "wrongful" if it was not authorized by statute at
the time it was filed, the trial court's conclusion regarding the wrongfulness of Dig-It's
lien implicitly presumes that the notice of commencement was valid when Dig-It filed its
mechanics' lien. This presumption effectively shifts the Hutters' Section § 38-l-31(5)(a)
burden of proving that their notice of commencement was enforceable to Dig-It, because
Dig-It would have to assume the building permit information was a valid notice of
commencement, subject to invalidation by Dig-It.
This shift of the Hutters' Section 38-1-31 (5)(a) burden to Dig-It would not only be
inconsistent with the plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 l(5)(a), but would also
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be inconsistent with the established doctrines for construing the Mechanics' Lien Act. As
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, u[t]he purpose and intent of Utah's Mechanics'
Lien A c t . . . manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor
and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building or other
improvement. Lien statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose"
Sill 162 P.3d at 1102-03 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Dig-It was authorized by statute to file its mechanics' lien at the time
it was recorded because a determination of whether Dig-It needed to file a preliminary
notice had not yet been made (and indeed could not have been made in light of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 38-l-31(5)(a)). Consequently, Dig-It's mechanics' lien was authorized by

statute and cannot be considered a wrongful lien under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 or
under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Statute pursuant to its incorporation of UTAH CODE
ANN. §38-9-1.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Dig-It respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
trial court's order nullifying Dig-It's mechanics' lien and that the Court over-rule the trial
Court's conclusion that the Hutters filed a Notice of Commencement on May 30, 2006
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 2008.
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